This is a collection of various attempts (some more convincing than others) to envision the look and feel of open elections, especially from the user's perspective.
Open elections are a form of decision making in which communities build consensus on political candidates, legislation, and policy, using an electoral system that is independent of government. Unlike ordinary elections, voting is continuous, and the voters are able to recast their votes without restriction. Candidates are not pre-selected by the dominant political parties, but rather are chosen by the voters on the fly. Legislation, plans, and policies are open to public drafting and voting.
As a voter, you can vote for anyone you choose. All you need is a person's email address. If you vote for her, she automatically becomes a candidate.
Whoever gets her vote will also get yours. And so on. Your vote is carried until it reaches a candidate who does not vote. This is called a delegate cascade. At the end of the cascade, votes accumulate to reveal the chosen candidates.
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Your vote can never be taken for granted. You can easily see how it cascades, and who ultimately receives it. If you dislike the result, or if you have questions, you can ask the candidate for an explanation. And if the explanation fails to satisfy, you can withdraw your vote at any time, or shift it to anyone you choose.
Vote as early as you like and as often as you like. Key issues and candidates are decided long before election day. By voting early, keeping informed, and guiding your vote accordingly, you can contribute far more to the final decision than someone who merely shows up at the polling station.
Elected officials will be aware that the election is continuous; it does not stop on the appointed election day. Voters will remain free to shift their votes. Office holders will always know where they stand, because their re-election prospects will graphically rise or fall according to their performance in office.
Electoral data and results are recorded continually in public archives. Anyone may independently download the data and verify the results of an ongoing election.
Use the electoral office's meta-service to create an election for a new legislative bill or policy document. Or set up an independent electoral server for other types of election, requiring custom procedural and eligibility rules. Use the office's live feed of electoral data to access the electoral register and authenticate the voters. Or use it to access the existing elections and to provide external services, such as alternative voting interfaces, or extended analyses of results.
Votorola can also serve to vote legislation into law. On its own, it allows the public to vote for or against individual bills. With the addition of a distributed drafting medium, it implements an open legislature in which the public can take responsibility for all stages of civil law making, from proposal to promulgation.
Just as legislation can be opened, so can policy. Distributed drafting can generate a diverse body of policy ideas, while cascade voting simultaneously pulls them together, resulting in one or more consensus documents. And a candidate for executive leadership can point to a particular consensus document with a vote of her own, clearly expressing where she intends to lead.
World affairs are currently governed by unaccountable powers — by a few wealthy states and a growing number of multinational firms — none of which were elected by the world's people. The world has never voted at all, on any issue. But that can change. Local electoral offices can interconnect to enable world elections.
A group of young people wish to make improvements to their neighbourhood park. They come up with a plan and begin to promote it locally. Some of them are in disagreement and propose alternative plans. They all share access to a medium of communicative assent. They use it to highlight their differences and to resolve them one by one. Eventually the whole neighbourhood agrees on a consensus plan. The City sends a safety inspector to the site, and trucks in some sand. With a little help, the young people complete the improvements to the park.
Some of the detail, behind the scenes:
Mae is a community leader in the neighbourhood, and the local delegate for the Mayor. When she learns of the plans to improve the park she takes an interest.
Mae speaks to Hal. Hal is the local delegate for the Public Health Officer. Mae asks Hal to look into the safety issues of the proposed plan. Hal agrees. He takes the lead in drafting a set of safety amendments. His amendments attract the votes of many parents in the neighbourhood. The votes are numerous enough to ensure that safety concerns are going to feature prominently in the plan.
The young planners have a question about the delivery of the sand, so they approach Wen. Wen is a local building contractor, and a delegate for the Public Works Office. He explains that several types of sand are available from the City yards. He says that delivery, however, will depend on budgetary approval. So they add “sand” to the budget section of their plan.
Later, when it appears that a consensus is likely to form at some point, Mae requests approval for the plan. She does not speak directly to City Hall, rather she speaks to her delegate — the person she is voting for in the Mayoral election. In reply she receives a signed email from the Comptroller of the Parks Department, authorizing a preliminary safety inspection of the site. Mae then forwards the authorization to Hal, who arranges for the actual inspection. When the safety inspector arrives, Hal guides her to the site...
The text is drawn (with paraphrasing and minor corrections) from a discussion in the E-Democracy and E-Government Researchers Network.4
We are sharing ideas (in this discussion) on how to build consensus. We have a group of 1000 people (say), tasked with reaching a consensus on a complex issue. Imagine they were selected by government, for example, and tasked with recommending a climate change policy. How could they reach general agreement? What preparation and assistance might they need? What methods and tools could they employ?
> > Could we bring larger numbers into a consensus-building process? > > Could we represent the full spectrum of society? > > We could employ an open, grassroots process (model B-3).
I agree — provided it's open to the full electorate (and the consensus is unforced), then it would be the same model as Votorola. It would have these advantages:
This last point has implications. Once a consensus forms in a community, it will naturally tap into state power via the electoral system [not literally true, as actual power is not drawn off, MCA]. Whatever the medium of consensus we develop, if it works for the backing of policy, then it will also work for the backing of legislation and the nomination of executives. If we place such a medium at the disposal of a community, then they will employ it for these purposes: they will independently express the policy they want pursued, the laws they want enacted, and the officials they want empowered. Strictly speaking, that would be a revolution [again, not true, as no power changes hands, MCA]. If party financing and party discipline were undermined by these changes (as appears likely), then no parliamentary government could stand against a willful and clearly expressed consensus. (The executive of a republic could stand in opposition, but only until the next election.)
> But you have no grounds to make that prediction. You must show how the process > could attract a large number of participants. Without participants, your consensus > will have no legitimacy.
I'll pose some concrete scenarios, if I may. I believe they'll have a mutual, knock-on effect with respect to participation levels.
The residents of Toronto initiate a continuous, open election for Mayor. Assume it is the first open election in any city. A voter might participate for these reasons:
In the course of the first 6 months, this election (on its own) might attract 10,000 voters. That would definitely not be a quorum for a city of 2.5 million, so it would not be perceived as legitimate (not yet).
A legal secretary, disgruntled by a recent property tax hike, obtains a copy of the City's tax code; rewrites it; and places it in the format of a proposed bylaw (Bylaw for Tax Reform). She posts it on her Web site; initiates an open bylaw election; and obtains a dozen initial votes from her friends. Open drafting and voting ensue, much as in the Minnesota scenario (substitute 'bylaw draft' for 'policy draft').
We can expect this (on its own) to attract the participation of numerous amateur bylaw drafters, and 100,000+ voters. Reasons for participation:
Soon (to continue the scenario) participation reaches 5,000, exceeding that of the mayoral election (still proceeding slowly, in parallel). Around the same time, about half of the leading mayoral candidates declare their support for the proposed Bylaw for Tax Reform, and promise to bring it to a Council vote, once elected. Each, however, plunks for a different proposed draft, one that allocates a different distribution of taxes. Participation in the mayoral election then jumps to match the higher level of the Bylaw election. Both of them, thus linked by the common issue of tax reform, proceed to climb at a faster rate than either of them alone. Everyone now expects participation to reach the level of an official election. Reason:
Europeans begin openly drafting a constitution. They start from the document that was previously rejected, making substantial corrections and amendments. (Scenario of open drafting and voting is similar to 2 above, but on a larger scale.) Participation grows rapidly, and is expected to be high, perhaps 75% of the electorate. Reason:
> But the EU Constitution is highly divisive. Many would opt out, > making the process unrepresentative. Many would only participate > negatively, derailing the process.
You are concerned not with the levels of participation (as was the previous poster), but a failure of participants to acheive a consensus (or legitimate consensus) owing to a premise or context dispute. Those who disputed the context would have no formal channel, it appears, in which to express their dissent. Either they must exclude themselves from the process, in silence (being unfair to themselves), or register a spoiler vote, in protest (being unfair to others).
In answering, I hope to show that the process itself contains the solution. The process we are speaking of is B-3, which is based on open, grassroots consensus. The solution lies in the fact that openness extends beyond participation, to include the framing of new contexts. To illustrate, allow me to relate two additional scenarios. These might follow from the previous three. In scenario 4, a solution is found by shifting and narrowing the context; in scenario 5, by widening it.
An economics student in the UK, being opposed to EU membership, decides that his opposition is best expressed in the context of UK foreign policy. He sketches a foreign policy draft that centers on withdrawal from the EU. He posts the draft on his Web site, and initiates an open election for it.
At the same time, he withdraws his vote from the election for the European Constitution (3), where he had been opposed to the entire process. Now that he can express his opposition in a more effective context, he no longer has a motive to spoil the EU election. (If the other EU members wish to have a constitution, then that is their affair.)
Other voters begin to follow his example, shifting their votes from the EU to the UK election. Others still, disagreeing with the proposed policy change, vote for alternative drafts that would maintain EU membership. The two elections then proceed in parallel.
After withdrawing their protest votes from the EU election, some of the dissenters turn around and recast their votes, this time voting in favour of certain constitutional drafts. They choose drafts, in particular, that would grant the UK a larger degree of autonomy within the union. In doing this, they are hedging their bets against the event of continued membership. But this also has the effect of providing other EU members with concrete proposals to consider; proposals that are taken seriously in light of the new election in the UK, and the threat of UK withdrawal. The effect of the new election is therefore to neutralize the context dispute that had poisoned the old EU election. It now proceeds on a more rational footing.
Meanwhile, a resident of France (call her Marianne) is also thinking about the election for the European Constitution. She does not agree with the statement (3) that "Europeans are defining for themselves what Europe is, and what it means to be European." She doubts that the EU really respresents Europeans, at large. In the election, she has voted against the constitution.
Marianne is heir to the universalism of the French Revolution. She does not feel that the values of Europe can be contained in Europe, any more than the ideas of the Revolution could be contained in France. Instead of a European Constitution, she would rather participate in something that seems more hopeful. So she drafts a page of HTML, with the title:
But what to put underneath? It cannot be left blank. A constitution ought, she reflects, to have a preamble about shared values. She thinks about this, and writes, "We believe in democracy..."
The effort to reach a consensus at that scale would have a positive effect on the EU constitutional dispute. It would put the EU and its member states in a clearer context. It might also have a positive effect on other disputes. It might, for example, bring the globalization protestors off the streets and into rational, constructive dialogue.
> But the EU Constitution is highly divisive. Can we really expect rational behaviour > from participants, as you suppose?
Yes. Imagine if we could listen in on the community:
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marc. Ciao Marianne, I like your idea of a Universal Constitution.
I've cast my vote for you!
mari. Thanks Marcello!
marc. I have to say, though, I think your own vote in the EU election
is *irrational*. Pardon me, but you see, you've voted for the
null draft of the Constitution (in other words against the
entire process of agreement). Logically, that means you want
all EU administrative institutions to be dismantled, and all
formal cooperation among European states to end.
mari. Oh dear, that's not what I intended! I would agree to keeping
agreements on cross-border issues, and common institutions
to administer them. What I'm opposed to is the added layer
of *government*.
marc. I thought so Marianne, that's why I wanted to speak with you.
You see, there's a group of us here in Napoli, and we're
working on a draft of the constitution that would reduce the EU
to its essential administrative and economic functions.
I'd like to send you an email, outlining our proposal.
mari. Yes please. I think I could vote for a proposal like that.
marc. We could use your vote, Marianne, it carries a lot of weight.
Even though you're only voting for the null draft, you have
many backers. No surprise there. You've become popular with
the voters.
mari. Oh, those are only my neighbours here in the village. They
vote for me in *all* the elections. And I hardly know how
to cast my own vote! It's a good thing my village has not
so many people... But I'll forward your email to them,
so they know I'm thinking of shifting my vote to your proposal.
marc. No need Marianne, I can see their addresses here. I'll CC them.
I'm sending it now...
mari. Thanks Marcello!
marc. My pleasure, and good luck in your work on the Constitution.
Ciao Marianne.
mari. Ciao Marcello.
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chri. So which draft of the EU constitution are you voting for, Nick?
Or do you have your own draft, like me?
nick You're kidding me, Christabel. I'm voting against the whole
thing. Brussels can stuff it.
chri. Are you out of your tree? Brussels is opposed to it. If we
don't reach *some* kind of agreement, then we're stuck
with whatever the Eurocrats give us. Nick, you're voting
for the status quo!
...
chri. Look Nicky, you know me, we see eye-to-eye. Why not vote
for me on this one?
nick Hmmm...
chri. You see, I've gathered quite a few votes for my draft. It's no
big deal, I've only made a few changes here and there. But
they listen to me. The drafter I'm voting for (she has a lot
of votes) she's using my changes! And so on, up the line.
It's kind of fun.
The text is modified from a discussion in the E-Democracy and E-Government Researchers Network.4
Resident A drafts a proposed Climate Change Policy for Minnesota, and posts it to the Web. Two days later, resident B reads it; copies it; makes changes; and posts a variant draft. Now there are two variant proposals on the table.
A day later, C posts a variant of B's draft. But C also votes for B (tentatively). B learns of this; examines the textual differences of C's document; and copies them into her own. C notices this, and decides to keep voting for B (for now). (The new policy is thus being drafted as a recombinant text, in combination with cascade voting.)
C
\
A B
S and T have no time to participate in the actual drafting, but they do like A's draft. They both vote for A. Meantime, U and V (also non-drafters) vote for B. At the end of one week, the situation is:
U
T | V
S / C | /
\ / \|/
A B
Another week goes by, and now D is studying the textual differences between A and B. She has been following the discussions in A's blog, and the mailing list of B's 'constituency'. She sees a possible bridge between the positions of A and B. She drafts a compromise, and explains it to A and B. They agree (tentatively) to vote for D's compromise draft. (B has trouble convincing V of this, and is worried about losing V's vote. But for now, a consensus holds.)
U
T | V
S / C | /
\ / \|/
A B
\ / various other cascades
\ / forming in parallel, not shown
\ /
D
D's draft now has a 7 vote backing. Consequently D has a measure of political clout. Other drafters, some with 50 or 60 votes in other cascades (not shown) would like to get D's vote (and the 7 others it carries). They are in discussions with D. D, meantime, is holding off, and looking for bridges among their separate positions, with an eye to proposing an even larger consensus.
At the end of six months, 6000 voters (including 300 drafters) are participating in the process. The governor's office takes notice. Approximately 40% of the participants are behind a single consensus draft; 15% behind another; and the rest are in ever-shifting splinter groups. The governor feels that 40% is not enough for action. His advisors, however, have noticed that many of the splinter groups are disputing technical points of science. The governor sees an opportunity in this, and decides to release funds for climate change research, aimed specifically at the points of contention.
After two years (in which participation has grown), a 55% consensus has emerged. Minnesota adopts the leading consensus draft as its official Climate Change Policy. During the same period, a rival consensus of 30% has formed on an alternative policy. It has been adopted, in turn, by a rival candidate for the Governor's office (a continuous election for Governor having been in progress, simultaneously).
Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2009 18:51:44 -0500 From: Fanny <fanny@compassrose.com> To: Jim Bolton <jimbo@cirrus9.net> Subject: Re: Open Elections > Linda blames you. She says you were the first in town to vote. > She says it's all your fault if she's become a rabble rouser! :)
Not fair, I wasn't the first! I may have been the first to vote for *Linda*, but that's her own fault. Because a few years back (you remember, I told you about it) she organized the renovation of that playground on Willow Street. So I figured, she's bucking for City Council! That's why I voted for her. (But seriously, none of us really expected anything to come of it. It was just something new, a different kind of election.)
> ...told me it was a legal secretary, somewhere downtown, who started > it all. She was unhappy with the property tax increase. So she got > hold of a copy of the City's tax code; rewrote it; and started an open > election for -- what did she call it? -- the ‘Bylaw for Tax Reform’.
So that's where the bylaw came from... good for her! It's true too, that's the election that kick-started things. I remember, it made the local news. Different versions of the bylaw were being drafted, each with a different tax redistribution. Some of them were pretty extreme! People were voting for one draft, or another.
I never looked at any of the drafts. (I can't make heads or tails of my own taxes.) But Mark has a friend in accounting. He knows all the numbers. We just voted for him. It worked out well. Whenever we had questions, he had the answers. So now he's our designated tax rep, for future elections.
Linda foresaw what was coming. She saved her candidate. She convinced her to keep out of the bylaw elections (there were several by then). The other Council candidates were staking positions, and attracting votes because of it. But she convinced her's to promise, instead, to support the *winning* draft (whichever, it didn't matter) and bring it to a Council vote. The other candidates were torn apart in the fray, but her's came up the middle ground!
> The part I never understood is how they could reach a consensus on the > bylaw. If City Hall were to propose the tax changes, then there'd be > open debate, sure enough. But everyone would be up in arms! They > would *never* come to an agreement...
That's what I expected, too. And the news reports at the time, they predicted the same thing. Everyone figured we'd divide into separate camps. And I guess people did split up, at first. But whenever the votes had settled down into a clear division — some voting for one proposal, some for another — the bylaw drafters managed to bridge the differences. Linda says they found compromise drafts. Or they just removed the difficult sections, where they couldn't agree. So the drafts came together, bit by bit, and the votes cascaded with them. Not much was changed in the end. A few loopholes were closed, that special interests had been taking advantage of. That kept it popular.
The biggest problem came afterwards. When everyone had finally agreed on it, the Budget Committee rejected it. They said it had technical faults. Council started to amend it. There was an outcry, and eventually the Mayor stepped in. He said it wasn't their bylaw to amend. He asked for the election to be re-opened, and for the drafters to negotiate directly with the Committee. Eventually we reached a second consensus. (The Mayor now calls himself the ‘Open Election Mayor’. He says his job was never so easy, as when he acted on a public consensus. Instead of opponents at every turn, he found allies.)
There's optimism in the air, now. People have started drafting
their own planning documents, and voting on them. Cities are sharing visions.
People are talking. The feeling is, almost anything is possible,
Fanny
P.S. Next to pass Council (my guess) is a proposed bylaw to replace Councillors' driving allowances (and the Mayor's chauffeured limousine) with free transit passes. Revenue savings will go to the transit budget.
Another initiative (also popular) is sidewalk snow removal. A bylaw to have the City do the work was steaming ahead until the Budget Committee estimated the taxes to pay for it. Now it's losing ground to an alternative proposal, based on fines, and a community policing network. It's similar to FixMyStreet, but the idea is more like 'ShovelYourSidewalk'; it doesn't hook into Public Works departments, but into Bylaw Enforcement and Revenue. People post infraction reports against local properties, and then follow up to make sure something gets done in the end. It's nice too, because it's not just about levying fines. It hooks into networks for local volunteer assistance (if someone needs help, temporarilly), and neighbourhood commercial services (snow removal, yard work, and so forth).5
| 1. |
Max Weber. The social psychology of the world religions. In From Max Weber. p. 280. As quoted in Habermas, TCA 1, p. 193.2 |
| 2. |
Jürgen Habermas. 1981, 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1. Reason and Rationalization of Society. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Beacon Hill, Boston. |
| 3. |
Jürgen Habermas. 1981, 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2. Lifeworld and System: a Critique of Functionalist Reason. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Beacon Hill, Boston. |
| 4. |
Building consensus online. Online Consultations, Dialogues, and E-Participation, DoWire Groups, January - February 2008. http://groups.dowire.org/r/topic/uRIMxHGd9vlEp5IZRP6yz |
| 5. |
Ideas for bylaw initiatives were contributed by members of Rabble Babble, PoliticsForum.co.uk and PoliticsForum.org. |
| 6. |
The park improvement plan is modified from original posts to these mailing lists: http://groups.dowire.org/r/topic/2ma78lpfH1ZqdOZv2k7R6j http://groups.dowire.org/r/topic/6VbcCacxpBG6tkOSrpIf9y |
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